

JOBS, MANPOWER AND EDUCATION

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
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Summary

This report deals with jobs, manpower and education. The expansion of jobs in the City and the Metropolitan Area, recent and prospective, favors a broad range of high-grade service activities, with growth concentrated in the professional-technical and clerical occupations. Even in manufacturing, where jobs have been declining, a shift to the higher grade "craftsman" occupations is underway. Since 1960, there has been a notable upgrading of the occupational skills and education attainment level of the labor force of the City and the metropolitan area, - including both white and non-white. Nevertheless, this upgrading has not been sufficient to correct a mismatch, in the City, of the occupational requirements of the new jobs, and the skills of the resident labor force. This mismatch affects the City's minority resident labor force most severely. To correct this mismatch, the City is working on two fronts, - (1) creation of blue collar job opportunities, and (2) improvement of manpower training programs, and upgrading of the quality of education through education reform.



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Manpower Demand, - Growth in Employment -, The Services Revolution

The decade of the sixties was a period of substantial growth, upgrading and structural change for the City of Boston economy. Reversing over a decade of decline, Boston has had a net gain of nearly 40,000 jobs since 1963. In the process of revitalization, the City experienced a structural transformation, from a center for manufacturing and trade and emerged as an expanding high grade service activity economy.

The key element in Boston's economic revitalization was the "services revolution" - the rising role of service activity employment in the national economy, a phenomena of the postwar period. Boston, with a specialization in a broad range of high-grade service activities which were growing nationally, - finance and insurance, medical services, higher education, recreation and tourism, business services, personal services and government services -, was able to take full advantage of the new opportunities.

Boston gained approximately 60,000 jobs in its service activities in the sixties and it appears, that in spite of the national economic slowdown in the early part of the seventies, employment in the City's service sector has continued to expand with the addition of 10,000 new service activity jobs in the first three years of the decade.

But while the City's services sector was making impressive employment gains, the City's industrial and trade sectors were in steady decline. In the same period, (1963-72) that the City gained nearly 70,000 service jobs, it lost over 30,000 jobs in the manufacturing and trade sectors. The major loss was in the manufacturing sector with leather, textiles and apparel leading the decline. Only fabricated metals and printing showed slight growth and stability. Intensifying the problems of the City's declining manufacturing employment further, is the recent closing of the Boston Naval Shipyard, which resulted in the loss of another 5,000 industrial jobs.

As a result of this growth pattern in employment, there was a dramatic reordering of the relative importance of Boston's industries. The role of manufacturing, which was the leading sector of the City's economy in the 1950's, accounting for 20 percent of all jobs, declined to approximately 10 percent of the City's employment in 1972. In direct contrast, service activities which made up approximately 38 percent of the City's employment in the early 1950's, now represents 56 percent of all jobs in Boston.

There were similar structural shifts in the Suburban Ring of the Boston Metropolitan Area economy, as well as in the State, and in the Nation as a whole. Although manufacturing employment remained relatively stable in the suburban economy, the relative position of the manufacturing sector declined, as the suburbs also experienced substantial growth in its services activities. Manufacturing employment, which accounted for over one-third of total employment in the Boston Metropolitan Area in 1950, now accounts for less than one-fifth of the Area's jobs. At the State level, nearly three-fourths of all job growth over the past twenty

years was in the service activities. Employment in the State's service sector expanded by over 400,000, from 1950 to 1970, and manufacturing employment declined by some 70,000 in the same period. In the U.S. economy, as a whole, the share of employment in the service activities rose from 28 percent in 1950, to 38 percent in 1970, while manufacturing went from 34 percent to 26 percent of total U.S. employment.

Employment projections for the next decade indicate a continuation of these shifts and economic growth trends. The most recent (December, 1973) U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics projections for the national economy show that over 60 percent of the job growth anticipated for the U.S. economy in the next twelve years will be concentrated in the services sectors: Government, Finance, Insurance, and other services. By 1985, services employment is expected to account for over 45 percent of all U.S. employment. For the City of Boston, projections indicate an amplification of the services oriented growth pattern, with nearly 80 percent of the approximately 90,000 new jobs which Boston may capture over the next ten years concentrated

in service activities. Projections for the Boston Metropolitan Area and State show similar employment growth trends.

Upgrading of the Labor Market, - Increase in the Skills Requirements of Jobs

Concomitant with these changes in the structure of the economy was a notable transformation and upgrading of the labor market. Reflecting the demands of a high grade services oriented economy, there has been significant growth in the white collar and higher skilled occupations.

In the City of Boston, over four-fifths of the growth in employment in the sixties was concentrated in two occupational fields, professional-technical and clerical. The major losses were in semi-skilled and unskilled blue collar jobs, which accounted for approximately 80 percent of the City's job losses. With the continued growth projected for the City's services industries, this shift in the occupational composition of the City's labor market is expected to continue. Nearly 70 percent of all new jobs in the City over the next

decade will be in the professional-technical and clerical occupations. In the blue collar field, only the skilled craftsman occupations are expected to have a net gain in jobs, but this growth will amount to less than 10 percent of all new job opportunities in the City.

As noted earlier, the industry pattern of suburban growth was not too different from that of the City. However, contrary to Boston's mixed experience, employment rose in all occupational groups in the suburbs in the sixties. Growth in employment of professionals, service workers, clerical workers and sales personnel in the suburbs was especially high; with the exception of the latter, these were the very occupations in which growth had centered in the City of Boston. Although the suburbs did experience some growth in the blue collar field, the relative share of suburban jobs in those occupations fell from 40 percent to approximately 30 percent of the jobs in the suburban labor market over the ten year period. More significant, however, was the fact that growth in suburban blue collar jobs was largely confined to the

skilled craftsman occupations.

The same pattern of change in the suburban labor market is anticipated for the seventies, with over 50 percent of the job growth concentrated in the professional-technical and clerical occupations. Moderate growth is expected in the blue collar occupation, but, as in the past, over 70 percent of this growth will be in the skilled craftsman occupations. The suburbs, like the City, have become a place where people with diplomas, degrees and skills are in demand and they are not a haven for the unskilled or uneducated worker.

The Labor Force and Its Occupational Characteristics

The growth, structural change and upgrading of Boston's economy and labor market, which we have briefly reviewed, presents only the demand side of a manpower analysis. The crucial issues for the City's planning and development effort are concerned with the City's labor supply: the character of the City's resident labor force and its ability to meet the needs and demands of a growing, high grade service economy. The key question that arises

in the City's manpower analysis is to what extent did Boston's resident work force benefit from the growth and upgrading of the City's job opportunities in the decade of the sixties?

One very apparent dichotomy was that while Boston's job base was expanding in the sixties, its population base, and therefore, resident workforce was declining. The City's labor force went from over 288,000 workers in 1960, to approximately 266,500 in 1970; a slightly lesser rate of decline than that for the population as a whole. More important than the decline in the size of the labor force, however, were the changes in the basic characteristics of the City's resident workforce: age and racial composition, educational attainment and occupational structure.

Age and Race Characteristics of the Labor Force

In the course of the decade, the median age of the City's labor force shifted slightly from 29.8 to 27.2. This shift in age composition reflects the net increase in the City's 15-29 year old residents and the heavy

outmigration among those 30 to 54. It is this latter age group which generally furnishes the major part of the experienced, skilled labor force. This change in age composition, however, did not have as serious an impact on the nature of the City labor supply as the more dramatic shift in the racial composition of the labor force.

Boston's population loss in the sixties was accompanied by a very significant influx of Black and Spanish-speaking residents. In 1960, less than 10 percent of the City's population was Black or Spanish-speaking. By 1970, one out of five of the City's residents were members of a minority group. This shift in racial composition of the population was directly reflected in the labor force. In 1960, approximately 10 percent of the City's labor force was Black or Spanish-speaking. By 1970, over 15 percent of the resident workforce were members of a minority group (Black 13.0 %, Spanish-speaking 2.2%, others 0.3%).

Although the City's minority workforce experienced significant upgrading in the course of the decade, most of the minority workers who entered the City's labor force

were predominantly low-skilled, blue collar workers.

Educational Attainment of the Labor Force

In spite of the shift in age composition toward the less-experienced, younger worker and the large influx of unskilled minority workers, Boston's labor force was substantially upgraded in the sixties. The educational attainment level for the resident workforce, as a whole, and for the nonwhite population, in particular, increased substantially. Median years of education for the total population 25 years and over, rose from 11.2 in 1960, to 12.1 in 1970. For the nonwhite population, the gain in educational attainment was even more substantial, with median years of education increasing from 10.2 in 1960 to 11.5 in 1970. The percentage of City workers with a high school degree increased from less than 35 percent of the labor force in 1960, to over 48 percent in 1970; and the number of resident workers with college degrees increased 59 percent since 1960; from 9.8 percent of the labor force to 15.6 percent in 1970. Despite this considerable educational upgrading of Bostonians, in comparison with the rest of the Boston Metropolitan Area,

the City levels of educational attainment lagged behind, although the gap was narrowed significantly, from a difference in median years of education of 0.9 in 1960 to 0.3 in 1970.

In comparison with the metropolitan area, however, a disproportionately larger percentage of Boston's males in the key occupational age range, 20-49, in 1970, had not finished high school (31% in Boston v.s. 21% outside the City). Interestingly, there was no difference among females aged 15 to 40; approximately 30% both in the City and outside Boston had not completed high school. Differences in educational attainment between young suburban whites (18-24) and young city whites are minor. However, young Black or Spanish-speaking adults (18-24) are much less likely to have finished high school or college than white youths living in the City or the suburbs. In 1970, over 70% of the white youths, 18 to 24, in Boston and the suburbs had completed high school, the percentage for Boston's Black and Spanish-speaking youth were 55 percent and 38 percent, respectively.

Boston's labor force, as a whole, had made considerable progress on the educational front, in the sixties, but the

gap with the suburban workers still remained, particularly for the City's minority workers. In a labor market that was continually shifting its demand towards the higher skilled, better educated worker, the City's resident worker force was still at a comparative disadvantage in competing for the growing job opportunities in the City.

The Upgrading of Occupational Skills of the Labor Force

An analysis of the occupational profile of Boston's resident labor force gives us a clearer indication of the extent to which it was equipped to meet the demands of the changing labor market. There was a significant shift in the occupational structure of the resident workforce following the basic pattern of growth and structural change in the City's labor market toward the professional, technical and clerical occupations. While there was an overall decline in the City's resident labor force of some 20,000 from 1960 to 1970, there was a net gain of 18,000 in the number of City residents in the professional, technical and clerical occupations. As a result, the share of City workers in these two occupations went from 35 percent

of the resident workforce in 1960, to 44 percent in 1970. In sharp contrast, the number of City residents in the blue collar occupations declined by over 28,000 and the portion of resident workers represented in these occupations fell from 37 percent in 1960 to less than 27 percent in 1970. There were corresponding shifts in the industrial composition of the resident workforce. The share of residents employed in the manufacturing industries declined by 34 percent, while the number of residents employed in service industries increased by over 25,000, or 40 percent. This shifted the share of City residents in the service activities from 23 percent in 1960 to over 34 percent of the total resident workforce in 1970.

The City's non-white labor force also experienced a significant degree of upgrading and occupational transformation in the course of the 1960-79 decade. In 1960, only 18.5 percent of the nonwhite resident workers were in the professional-technical, managerial and clerical occupations, while over 40 percent were in the blue collar occupations, with the heaviest concentration in the "operative" classification.

By 1970, the three white collar occupations accounted for nearly 36 percent of the nonwhite labor force, which was now nearly equivalent to the share of the nonwhite labor force in the blue collar jobs, (37.5 percent). More interesting, however, was the fact that the major decline in blue collar occupations occurred in the lower skilled "operative" classification, while there was a significant increase in the number of nonwhite workers in the higher skilled craftsman occupations.

The Mismatch of Job Requirements and Occupational Skills

Despite this substantial upgrading and structural shift in Boston's resident labor force, it appears that it was unable to keep pace with the growth and the changing composition of the jobs in the City. We have estimated that well over two-thirds of all the new job growth in the City in the decade of the sixties went to suburban residents. In 1960, commuters living outside the City accounted for slightly over 50 percent of the jobs, but by 1970, when there were approximately 528,000 jobs, commuters held 315,000 or 60 percent of the total jobs, in the City.

To some extent, the substantial growth in the share of City jobs held by non-residents, was the result of an expanding job base and a declining resident workforce; allowing for a greater reliance on job in-commuters to fill the available jobs. But the commuting patterns indicate that it was much more than this. While the City's employed resident workforce declined by 20,000, the number of City jobs held by City residents, declined by 29,000, with a 9,000 increase in the number of City residents commuting out of the City to work. In 1960, 84 percent of the City's resident workers held jobs in the City, but by 1970, only 79% of Boston's resident workers held City jobs. It would appear that fewer (both absolutely and relatively) Bostonians have found it advantageous or possible to work in their home city, despite a continually growth in the City's job base.

The basic reason for this development becomes more apparent when we compare the occupational profiles of Boston residents and the suburban workforce with the occupational skill requirements of the City jobs. In

comparing the occupational profile of the City resident workforce with the occupational skill mix of the City's jobs for 1960 and 1970, it is apparent that the upgrading of the City's labor force has narrowed considerably the structural imbalance between the occupational skills of the workforce and the occupational requirements of the City job market, but a serious imbalance still remains. While over 62 percent of the City's jobs are in the expanding white collar occupations, only 54 percent of the City's workforce have these occupational skills. However, the City has a higher concentration of its resident labor force in the blue collar field relative to the City jobs demanding these skills. Overall, the City's labor force managed to narrow the gap in the professional and clerical occupations, but there still is a comparative deficit of Bostonians experienced in managerial and administrative work and skilled trades; and a comparative surplus of those experienced in low-grade service and less skilled manual work.

When we compare the occupational profile of the City's workers with the suburbanites, the occupational deficiencies in the City labor force are apparent. The suburban labor force, with its better educated workforce, has managed to upgrade and adjust to the changing labor market demands more readily than the City's workers. The suburban richer occupational mix and higher level of job skills puts Boston resident workers at a distinct disadvantage when competing for the growing higher grade job opportunities in the City. For example, while the share of Bostonians in the City's professional and managerial occupations increased from 18 percent in 1960, to 22 percent in 1970, the percentage of suburbanites holding these higher grade jobs was considerably higher in both years, (26 percent in 1960; 30 percent in 1970) and despite the upgrading of City residents, the gap remained unchanged. From 1960 to 1970, the number of City residents in professional jobs increased by 21 percent while the number in managerial positions decreased by

over 10 percent. In contrast, the number of professional suburbanites increased by 48 percent and the number of managers by over 16 percent in the same period.

The structural imbalance was more severe for the City's minority workforce; particularly when compared on the basis of sex. With over 27 percent of the City jobs in the professional managerial occupations, only 14 percent of the employed nonwhite, male residents were in these occupations. This compares with 23 percent of the City's white males, and over 35 percent of the suburban males. However, major gains were made by the City's black females in narrowing the gap with their white female counterparts in the labor force. Approximately 17 percent of the City's black females were in managerial or professional jobs, which compares favorably with the 21 percent of white females in these occupations. The heaviest concentration of black males was in the lower-skilled manual and low-grade service occupations. Over 34 percent of black males held operative or laborer jobs and 20 percent were service workers. The comparable figures for the City's white males and suburbanites were 20 percent as operative-laborers and

12 percent as low-grade service workers. The disparities for the City's Spanish-speaking workers are greater at all levels, except for the professional category.

Although the City's minority workforce is still at a comparative disadvantage in competing for the City's growing job opportunities, there were very substantial gains made in the course of the sixties. Approximately 40 percent of the gap was eliminated between the shares of the City's minority workers and the white workforce in the professional, managerial and sales occupations; 70 percent of the gap in the clerical occupations, and the share of minority workers in the skilled craftsman jobs now exceeds that of the workforce as a whole.

Improvement in the Quality of the City's Labor Force

In summary, the City's resident labor force has made substantial progress, both educationally and in the upgrading of its occupational skills. It has narrowed considerably, the structural imbalance between the occupational requirements of the growing job opportunities that are available in the City. But it is still at a comparative disadvantage with the suburban labor force, which is better educated

and has a richer occupational mix. As a result, the City's residents have not been able to capture a proportionate share of the new job growth in the City, which has been concentrated in the higher skilled white collar occupations.

Favorable Impact of Economic Growth on the City's Labor Force

However, in reviewing the occupational profile and the unemployment and underemployment statistics for the City, it is apparent that, overall, the City's labor force has benefitted from the growth in the City's economy. Nevertheless, a segment of the labor force has remained outside the mainstream of the City's economic growth and expanding job opportunities.

Reduction of Unemployment

In 1950, the City had an unemployment rate of 7.4% (of its labor force) in comparison with the Boston Metropolitan Area average of 5.7%. In 1960, the gap had been narrowed somewhat with City unemployment at 5% and the SMSA average at 3.8%. By 1970, however, the City's unemployment rate had declined at a faster rate than that of the metropolitan area as a whole, and the difference between the City and metropolitan area unemployment rate was less than 1 percent (4.4% City vs. 3.6%).

For the City's nonwhite workforce, although unemployment was significantly higher, there was a substantial improvement in their relative employment situation over the decade. In 1960, unemployment for the City's nonwhite workforce was 8 percent, but by 1970, it averaged 6.4 percent.

Despite the gain, it is apparent that the City's minority labor force with its lower occupational skills and educational attainment levels had not been able to fully participate in the City's economic growth. This is particularly true for the Black and Spanish-speaking males. Among Black males, the unemployment rate in 1970 was 7 percent and for Spanish-American males unemployment ran at a high 9 percent. The City's youths were even further removed from the mainstream of the City's activities. According to a special 1970 Census and employment survey, unemployment for the City's population aged 16 to 21 (who participated in the labor force) was at 16%, and for black youths in this age group it ran as high as 25 percent. The survey also points out that more than 52 percent of those unemployed and seeking work did not complete high school.

In reviewing the statistics set out above, it is apparent that, overall, the City's labor force did benefit from the City's economic growth. Unemployment in the City is a case of structural unemployment: concentrated in that segment of the City's labor force which had not been sufficiently upgraded, and lacked the skills or education to take full advantage of the growing job opportunities in either the City or the Suburban labor markets.

Need to Enhance the Upward Mobility of the City's
Minority Labor Force

When we consider that the high unemployment rates for the City's minorities and youths reported in the 1970 Census reflected a period of economic expansion and prosperity in the Boston area, we realize that the City's unemployment problems are deep-seated, and defy any simple solutions.

In attempting to deal with the City's unemployment problems, there are two basic approaches: (1) to expand the City's job base to provide new job opportunities in occupational fields and at skill levels that are more compatible with the City's labor force profile; and

(2) to upgrade the City's labor force skill levels so they are more compatible with the job opportunities that are growing in the City. The City administration is moving on both fronts in an attempt to improve the City's unemployment problems.

Creation of Blue Collar Jobs, - New Industrial Work Centers

The recently created EDIC (Economic Development and Industrial Commission), in the office of the Mayor, has been given the task of expanding the City's industrial, blue-collar job base. In the past three years, the EDIC efforts have been directed towards (1) meeting the needs of the City's industrial firms so that they may continue to function here, and (2) attracting new industrial firms into the City. A number of Boston manufacturing enterprises have critical needs for additional space for modernizing, rationalizing or expanding production, and land assembly in the City presents difficult problems; in fact, a survey conducted in 1970 identified this as the number one problem of manufacturing industry in Boston.

To facilitate its efforts, the EDIC has created a special Industrial Financing Authority which can provide financial assistance loans to City firms, and a quasi-public development corporation, BEDIC (Boston Economic Development Industrial Corporation). BEDIC can purchase and/or develop industrial parcels in the City for lease or sale to private developers or industrial firms. Through the BEDIC, the City hopes to develop several mini-industrial parks or work centers in Boston neighborhoods. The preparation of the first such "work center" the Allston-Mapes site in Dorchester, is already well underway, and when complete will provide approximately 500 industrial jobs.

Blue Collar Job Creation - Plans for Reuse of the Boston Navy Yard

In another special effort, the EDIC, the BRA, Mass Department of Commerce and Development and the Mass Port Authority have given top priority to planning for the conversion and reuse of the Boston Naval Shipyard. Some of the 100 plus acres of land will provide an excellent potential for expansion of the City's blue collar job base. It is hoped that the 5,000 jobs lost at the Naval Yard

when the Navy abandoned the site, can more than be replaced by new industrial and commercial jobs.

Blue Collar Job Creation-the Southwest Corridor

Another important effort to expand the City's industrial base includes the plans for redevelopment of the State-owned vacant land along the Southwest Corridor right-of-way. The City's planning and development agencies are working with the State to develop plans for industrial reuse of some of this land.

Blue Collar Job Creation-Other Efforts

In addition to these industrial sites, the EDIC has under study several other industrial locations scattered throughout the City. It is estimated that the City has well over 200 acres of good industrial land that is now either vacant or underutilized and can, through the efforts of an agency like the BEDIC, be upgraded for more modern and intensive industrial reuse.

With the EDIC giving special priority to expanding the industrial job base, the City's planning and development programs will continue to encourage growth in the City's service activities. In facilitating the City's growth in the service activities, the City will provide the broadest number of job opportunities for the City's

resident workforce at all occupational levels.

Given the past and recent growth trends and the projected growth pattern for the local, regional and national economies, it is likely that success in expanding the City's industrial base will be modest, but important. The effort is aimed at reversing manufacturing job loss, and creating 4,000 to 10,000 new jobs. In the past three years, (1970-73) the City lost over 7,000 manufacturing jobs, the Metropolitan Area lost 24,000, and the State lost nearly 50,000. Although those figures reflect the recent declines in the Area's defense industry and the general national economic slowdown, in the context of the Area's long-term growth pattern, it is unlikely that there will be any major growth in the Area's industrial base in the near future.

When and if the Boston area does make a recovery in its industrial base, there is some question of just how far those new blue collar jobs will go to help alleviate the problem of the City's unemployed, low-skilled resident workers. The industrial growth that did

occur, and is likely to occur, in the Boston area is predominantly in the higher-skilled, technologically oriented job market.

Strategy for the Unemployed and Under-Employed

With the situation as outlined above, it would appear that the second approach: upgrading the educational and occupational skill levels of the City's resident workers to meet the demands of the area's labor market, would in the long run do more to improve the City's structural unemployment problem.

The City's efforts to upgrade the resident labor force include (1) development of an effective manpower training program, and (2) upgrading the City's educational system.

Manpower Training

Manpower training is seen as an immediate remedial effort which would upgrade a limited, but important segment of the City's adult labor force. Improving the City's educational system through far-reaching reforms, would be the longer term approach to upgrading the City's labor force.

The present manpower planning efforts for the City center around the recently created Boston Manpower Planning Council. The Boston MAPC is responsible for developing manpower planning guidelines, coordinating manpower training programs, and allocating a share of the manpower training funds for the City and some of the surrounding communities.* Private business, and the private foundations of the City are also heavily involved in sponsoring manpower training programs.

The past record of the manpower training efforts in the City has been, with some notable exceptions, only modestly effective. In the past, the manpower development efforts in the City have been plagued by fragmentation, poor planning and coordination. Recent changes, however, in the structure and administration of the manpower training system at the local level has improved the effectiveness of the program. The creation of the cooperative area manpower planning system (CAMPS) in 1970, and more recently the Boston MAPC, has gone a long way in reducing duplication

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The BMAPC encompasses the labor market of the City of Boston, Brookline, Revere, Winthrop and Chelsea.

of efforts and improving efficiency and delivery of services. The reorganization and the allocation of more manpower monies directly to the local authorities (under Revenue Sharing) has given the City administration more control over the local manpower planning operations.

Under the BMAPC, a major effort has been made to decentralize the manpower training delivery system in an attempt to strengthen the efficiency and effectiveness of the planning process. Under this system, the BMAPC has created a set of subcommittees, each responsible for reviewing in depth the manpower proposals of sponsor agencies for specific target groups in the City population who would be serviced by the manpower training programs. Recommendations are then made by the subcommittees for the consideration of the BMAPC planning staff as a whole. The subcommittees have broad representation from various segments of the population familiar with the problems and needs of the City's unemployed and underemployed population. The first two subcommittees established were those for youth and the Spanish-speaking. A Labor Market

Advisory Council (LMAC) was also established to provide BMAPC planning staff with analysis of labor market conditions and to evaluate and advise on occupational training programs.

The major drawback in the City's current manpower training efforts is a lack of funds. Manpower training funds have been severely cut back under the Nixon administration. For Fiscal 1974, the BMAPC has \$6.7 million in manpower training funds. The BMAPC has estimated that the total "universe of need"--those in need of some form of manpower training and skill upgrading - for the MAPC area is 166,000.

With the limited resources available, Mayor Kevin White and the BMAPC have decided to concentrate their efforts on the specific needs of the City's "disadvantaged poor" population which is estimated at 50,000 (30,000 blacks, 16,000 Spanish-speaking, 3,500 Chinese and others). The subgroups of the disadvantaged poor which will receive priority are: the non-English-speaking poor, minority and poor youth (16-21), minority women, and offenders and ex-offenders. With the severely limited manpower however, the BMAPC estimates that less than 10 percent

of the universe of need (50,000) will receive any significant manpower training assistance in 1974. Additional training resources will be available through some still existing categorical grant programs such as JOBS and WIN, but even with these programs, the number of persons receiving manpower training will still fall far short of the need.

Although there has been substantial progress made by the City in upgrading the efficiency and effectiveness of its manpower development program, there is still considerable room for improvement. The MAPC needs to develop better information and follow up on the training programs so it can more accurately evaluate the performance of each program and allocate resources more efficiently. There is a need for a more comprehensive "manpower needs" analysis for the Boston area so it can provide better guidelines for manpower training, not just for today's jobs, but for tomorrow's opportunities.

Improved guides on the occupational demand of the future labor market are also desired by the private enterprises and foundations active in manpower training activity.

The City's manpower training program provides one of the most direct and effective means of upgrading the City's labor force, so that a larger share of the City's residents can participate in the City's economic growth and increase their penetration in the higher grade job opportunities in the growing service industries. The extent to which the City's manpower programs can accomplish these objectives, will be largely dependent on the resources it has available, but it is also dependent on the efficiency and effectiveness of the City's manpower training programs.

The Role of Education Reform

(To be added)

Reforming the City's Educational System

Labor economists tell us that a young worker coming onto the job market in the 1970's may be expected to change job categories at least five times during his working years. Given the rapid rate of social and technological change, the one thing we can predict with certainty about the economy is that some of the jobs that today's 18 year old will eventually assume do not now exist. This suggests two things: first, that manpower and job retraining programs will become a permanent part of our economy; and second, that there must be a dramatic reorientation of goals and revitalization of performance of our public education system.

The problems of the Boston Public Schools have been subject to considerable analysis and exposure these past few years, ranging from the scathing attack of Jonathan Kozol through the journalistic portrait of Peter Schrag to the more sober and scholarly assessment of the Cronin Report. Despite the variations in tone and emphasis, a common picture emerges from these studies -- that of a school system highly bureaucratized, resistant to change, defensive toward the outside world, a system that exists in splendid isolation from the rest of city government as well as from the economic life of the city. Clearly some forward progress has been made in the last year and a half under the leadership of Superintendent Leary, but there is ample evidence that the gap is widening between the need for an increasingly educated and flexible work force and the productivity of the Boston Public Schools.

The difficulty of obtaining accurate data on the productivity of the schools is symptomatic of the insular attitude of the Boston School Committee. Although there

are no published dropout statistics, our best guess is that approximately 25 per cent of those who enter high school citywide never finish. In some schools - the predominantly black Boston Trade, for example - the dropout rate is in excess of 50 per cent.

Of those who do complete high school, approximately 45 per cent go on to some form of further education. The numbers going on to degree - granting colleges vary enormously, from virtually 100 per cent at the selective Latin schools to less than 15 per cent at the district high schools in East Boston and Charlestown. Unfortunately, no follow-up data is collected which might help us learn how well Boston graduates are prepared for higher education, or what kinds of careers are pursued by those who drop out of higher education prior to completing a degree program. For our purposes here however, we will focus on the 40 per cent of high school graduates who go directly to work.

What kind of career education is available in the Boston schools to the student who is not college-bound? The first relevant statistic is that although more than half the city's high school students are planning no further education, only 12 per cent are enrolled in any kind of vocational course. At a time when there are approximately 6500 unfilled jobs in the city, less than 2500 of the approximately 21,000 students in Boston's secondary schools are being equipped with the entry-level skills necessary to assume immediate employment.

Of those students who are being given vocational preparation, the majority are in Cooperative Industrial programs in such trades as printing, auto mechanics, electrical work, and machine shop. These programs are designed and operated in close cooperation with the trade unions, with a substantial component of on-the-job training. Although these programs are generally successful in training and placing their students, one must ask whether they are targeted on the students with greatest need, and whether the skills being taught will

continue to be in demand. Less than 10 per cent of the 1500 co-op students are black, and in two schools with substantial black populations (Dorchester and Jamaica Plain) the trades being taught are cabinet making and agriculture. Neither might be termed a growth industry.

The picture that emerges, then, from these few statistics is that of a school system which prepares the majority of its students neither for higher education nor for employment. It should in fairness be pointed out that approximately a third of the female graduates assume clerical positions, which means that perhaps such courses as typing, shorthand, and office practice should be construed as vocational, but the fact remains that the 25 per cent who drop out, as well as a substantial percentage of those who graduate, have been equipped with few if any saleable skills.

What this means, of course, is that an increasingly large percentage of an increasingly skilled city work force consists of people educated and residing in the suburbs. Clearly the city's employers cannot be blamed for preferring skilled to unskilled recruits, especially in those fields in which the job requirements are increasingly technical and specialized. But there are substantial social and economic costs to the city's corporate community if it is forced to hire suburban rather than city dwellers. The reported unemployment rate among black youth in 1970 was 25 per cent, and there are substantial reasons for believing that figure to be a serious underestimate. The measurable costs of such unemployment are reflected in such statistics as rising crime rates and welfare payments. The costs in wasted human potential and in the stockpiling of "social dynamite" (James Conant's phrase) cannot be measured, but they cast a very grave shadow over all of the more optimistic economic and social projections we have been making about the city's future.

What can be done to revitalize the City's public education system and to reorient that system to help prepare the City's youngsters to live and work in a world rapidly approaching the 21st century? First, there must be a shared recognition that schools are everybody's business, that "education (to quote former U.S. Education Commissioner Francis Keppel) is too important to be left to educators". For too long the school system has been allowed to drift along in isolation from the rest of the City's governmental and economic life. For too long the myth has been perpetuated that only the Boston School Committee and organized parent and teacher groups have a right to speak out on educational issues. Everyone who lives or works in the City has a direct stake in the quality of the City's schools, most especially the City's employers. Given the fact that almost a third of the City's operating budget is spent by the School Committee, the Mayor most emphatically has a stake and a right to speak out.

Five months ago Mayor White, in conjunction with a coalition of neighborhood groups, unveiled a sweeping plan to reorganize the Boston Public Schools. The plan has three broad goals: to increase the degree of parent and teacher participation in decision-making at the local level; to establish a clearcut chain of administrative and fiscal responsibility and accountability; and to provide for much more coordinated planning and resource-sharing between the school department and other related city departments. The plan calls for the establishment of a network of elected neighborhood councils with substantial personnel and budgetary powers, for significant transfer of administrative authority from the central office to six area offices, and for the incorporation of the school department into city government with a Superintendent accountable to the Mayor. Under this plan the responsibility for education, as for all other city services, would ultimately rest with the Mayor. Under the present system, the buck

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passes back and forth between a Mayor responsible only for raising the education dollar and a School Committee responsible for spending it.

This plan is one of four alternative approaches to restructuring the School Committee which will appear on a citywide referendum ballot in April. The plan receiving the most votes will then appear in a run-off against the present School Committee structure on the November ballot. In our view the prospects for initiating the kinds of massive changes in philosophy and program that can lead to a measurable increase in the productivity of the City's schools rest entirely on the success of the Mayor's reorganization proposal, for only if the system is opened up to the winds of change can the kind of coalition be built which will force the schools to face up to the City's changing social and economic needs.

